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In the Suprem.e Court of the
State of Utah

MARINUS JOHNSON and
ARLIN DAVIDSON,
Plaintiffs and Respondents.,

vs.
JOSEPH KOYLE, DUKE PAGE,
and JOHN DOE SYRETT,
Defendants,
DUKE PAGE,
Defendant and Appellant.

CASE
NO. 8404

Brief of Appellant, Duke Page
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prior, to the 21st day of May, 1940, the plaintiff
Marinus Johnson, was the owner of Water Filing No. 9873,
filed in the office of the State Engineer of Utah, which he
had acquired from one William F. Pratt and one Owen (Tr.
P. 22). At that time the plaintiff, together with one Joseph
Koyle, who is joined in this action as a party defendant, had
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a written agreement with one William F. Pratt for the acquisition of 440 acres of land, which is to be hereinafter described, located in Juab ·County, Utah. Pratt, prior to the
time that this agreement was entered into, was homesteading
the property, and had merely a right of homestead but did
not have a marketable title, and/wowd not have one until the
hornestead was perfected, which was contingent upon the
homestead requirements of the law of the United States and
upon Pratt surviving to perfect the homestead. With this
in mind, on the 21st day of May, 1940, the plaintiff, Marinus
Johnson, and the defendant, Duke Page, entered into a written agreement which eontemplated the use of the land which
was subject to the homestead to be made by and perfected
by Pratt. This agreement set forth, among other things,
that Marinus Johnson was the owner of Water Filing No.
9873, and that in order for the Water Filing to be of any
value, it would be necessary for the parties to ~con~truct certain dikes, levies and ditches from the source of water
in Juab County, kno\vn as Baker's Hot Springs, to the land
then owned by Pratt, which was to be acquired under the
contract between Johnson and Pratt, to Johnson and for
which Page .was to receive an interest" when it was so perfected. The purpose of the contract was that the defendant, Page, w.as to furnish money and equipment necessary
to build the dikes and: levies and that the· plaintiff would
contribute services, and that the defendant, Page, would be
paid. for his adv:ancement by receiving one half of the water
right and improvements, together with one half of the property that was to be acquired by the contract. In other
words, both parties "vere to ~hare equally in the: water, im..
provements and the property that was acquired and. in the
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contributions made, even though the defendant, Page, was
to advance the money .at that time.
Thereafter, during the summer of 1940, Page sent men
and equipment to work upon the canals and levies and dikes
mentioned in the contract and that the plaintiff, Johnson,
furnished a truck, and the men worked for a period of approximately twenty-eight days and that during this period
Page paid for all gasoline, oil and supplies for this project.
There is a conflict of evidence as to whether the proaect
was completed; however, it is the position of the defendant
that it was (Tr. P. 54, Tr. P. 112). At the end of this period
both parties withdrew their equipment and the men from
the job and it never again was resumed. Shortly thereafter, William Pratt died without having acquired a patent
or title to the land, which was part of his agreement with
Johnson.
Approximately three years later the widow of Pratt
received title to the land by perfecting the homestead, and
she conveyed. on May 7, 1943, this land to the defendant,
Duke Page, for $440.00. On October 4, 1944, the defendant,
Page, entered into a written agreement with one Oran Lewis
by which he was to sell and convey 440 acres of land, together with his interest in the Water Filing, for a price of
$3,750.00. The said Lewis paid Page $350.00 and received
a deed to one forty-acre piece of property, t~wit:
Northeast % of the Southeast :14 of Section 10,
Township 14 South, Range 8 West.
At this time the agreement between Page and Lewis
was terminated by a mutual 'Consent in respect to the remainder of the property.
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During the years 1944 through 1954, Page paid the
taxes upon the said property, which has been in his name,
and has made all other and necessary expenditures to the
maintenance and operation of the property and has held the
title ostensibly as sole owner. That on October 1, 1949,
Water Filing No. 9873 lapsed because Page failed to submit a proof of use or obtain a further extension of time to
do so, and that after the appUcation lapsed, the plaintiff,
Davidson, filed upon the water and appropriated it to his
own use. Arlin Davidson, one of the plaintiffs in this case,
also acquired title to the forty acres sold by Page to Lewis
and, in addition, claims title to the property in question as
a result of an agreement entered into between himself and
the plaintiff, Marinus Johnson, and his wife, Katy Johnson,
on the 27th day of May, 1952, whereby the said Johnson
did sell and assign and convey a one-half interest in the
property described in the plaintiffs' complaint.
On the 26th day of September, 1952, suit was commenced by the plaintiffs in the District Court of Juab County, State of Utah, to determine the right, title and interest
of each of the above named plaintiffs and defendants in the
following described property locarted near Baker's Hot
Spring, Juab County, State of Utah:
Northeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of
Sec. 10; North Half of the Southwest Quarter, North
Half and the Southeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter, all in Sec. 11; East Half and the Southwest Quarter
of the Northeast Quarter; Southeast Quarter of the
Northwest Quarter;Northeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter, all in Sec. 14.
All of said property being in To\vnship, 14 South,
Range 8 West, Salt Lake Base and lVIeridian.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
PO'lNT 1
THAT THE COURT ERREJJ) IN FINDING THAT
THE PLAINTIFFS HAD ANY CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS,
EITHER E~RESS OR IMPLIED, THAT COULD BE
ENFO~RCED.

POINT 2
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILIN·G TO DISMISS THE PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION OR FIND
FOR THE DEFENDANT, PAGE, FOR REASON THAT
THE SAME WAS BARRED BY LACHES· AND THE
STATUTE O~F LIMITATIO'N.
POINT 3
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FIND'ING THAT
THE TITLE TO PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY PAGE WAS
HELD SUBJECT TO THE RIGHTS OF JOHNSON AS
JOINT ADVENTURER UNDER AGREEMENT- AND
IN IMPOSING A TRUST UPON ALL THE PROPERTY
ACQUIRED BY PAGE FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE
PLAINTIFFS.
POINT 4
THAT THE CO·URT ERRED IN ASSESSING ONEHALF OF THE TAXES AGAINST PAGE.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE PLAINTIFFS HAD ANY CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS,
EITHER EX1PRESS OR IMPLIED, THAT COULD BE
ENFORCED.
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In order for ~he plaintiffs to recover .anything under the
contract, they must show that the same was in good standing, at least from their point of view, and that the defendant has no legal reason for non-performance or non-compliance. This is the basic premise to this entire suit.
The plaintiff by his pleading admits that the land in
question was the land included in that agreement between
himself, Joseph Koyle and one WilUam F. Pratt (See paragraph 3 of plaintiffs' second Amended Complaint) and that
the tit~~ to this land was to be perfected by Pratt, who was
then homeste~ding the same. This contract was dated
March 8, 1939, and was for the obvious purpose of uniting
this land, as soon as the patent was obtained, with the water
to be secured under the plaintiff's application No. 9873,
whi·ch apparently had been filed :by Pratt· to be used on the
land· Pratt was homesteading. The plaintiff, at that time,
had commenced the construction work on the dikes and
levies that later became an essential part of the contract
between Johnson and Page. This fact is rightfully concluded in the court's Findings of Fact Nos. 1 and 2.
"That on the 21st d~y of May, 1940, the plaintiff,
Marinus Johnson, was the owner of water filing No.
9873 filed in the office of the State Engineer of Utah
and the water rights represented thereby being an application filed by William F. Pratt to appropriate 19
c. f. s. of water fr~m a spring known as Baker Hot
Spring for irrigation of lands adjacent thereto."
"Tl)at at that time said plaintiff together with the
defendant, Joseph Koyle, had a written agreement with
said William F. Pratt for the acquisition by said Johnson and Koyle of 440 acres of land described in plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, which land said Pratt
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was then occupying or claiming under some preferential
entry right."
In· other words, the same 440 acres of ground encompassed hy the plaintiffs' complaint and the Court's findings
1 aild 2 is the same 440 acres referr~d to in the Court's Con-

clusion of Law No. 2:
. ''That by reason of this the title acquired by Page
· · to the 440 acres of land involved herein should be considered to be held subject to the rights of Johnson as
a joint adventurer under said agreement."
The next premise to consider, then, is what the parties
in~ended by their contract of May 21, 1950, 'which contract
this suit was based upon. Obviously and admittedly, the
parties intended. that· Johnson would initially put up his
water application and Page would put up money and equipment to build the levy. Now, what were they going to_ put
the water on and for what purpose were they going to bulld
the dikes and levies? The answer to this question is obvious
--the land which Johnson was to acquire from Pratt by
contract, which acquisition was conditioned upon Pratt perfecting his title by homesteading it (See Transcript Page
55).
It was for this reason that the contract (Exhibit "A")
contained the f<ollowing language:
.

'

"and the second party shall also be enttield to an equal
one-half interest in any and all lands or interest therein,
or contracts with respect to lands or interests therein,
owned or possessed by the First Party, or to the-. acquired in any lands or property connected with or pertaining to the appropriation within the project conte·m7 .
plated."
(Emphasis added)
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8:
Although the above cited :passage is not clear in and of
itself the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of the Court and
the circumstances surrounding this contract show conclusively that the property intended by this agreement was the
property to be obtained by Johnson under the contract. How
else were they going to use the water?
"In the interpretation of an agreement the surrounding circumstances at the time it was made should
be considered for the purpose of ascertaining its meaning."
Daly v. Old, 35 Utah 74, 99P. 460.

For the :plaintiff to contend that there was no specific
piece of land intended or contemplated (Tr. Page 15, 23, 25;
Page 96) is contrary to both law in fact. In the first place
he says (Tr. Page 15) "and we went down to Delta. He
looked the property over'', which indicates that a particular
piece of property was intended and an integral part of the
contract~
In the second place, the court is charged with
judicial knowledge that a water filing without land to beneficially use it upon is of absolutely no value. The plaintiff
admits he hao no other l·and other than that contracted for,
and, consequently, how can he say he merely owned a water
~pplication (Tr. Page 15). You can't own that ·without the
land to put it on, therefore, when Pratt died and it became
obvious that Johnson could not perform his part of the
agreement, the contract terminated for lack of a subject
matter.
The Whole contract was contingent upon Pratt ·perfecting title which in turn Johnson would get by contract;
otherwise,. what was Page to get for his efforts? Although
the language of the contract is broad it is obvious· that no
one ever intended that the ·contract would have a coptinuing
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effect to make Page a trustee of property acquired at a
later date by Page, not through Johnson or Pratt, hut from
another party.
If the court's rational in respect to Conclusion No. 2
were sotind then Page would become an unwilling trustee
for Johnson if he acquired the property by any means and
at any time afterward--even if he acquired irt by inheritance,
purchase or foreclosure.
This, surely, is attaching a meaning far different than
the language and intent of the parties anticipated.
The true fact is, that when Pratt died the contract
ceased to he enforceable, for a condition precedent to liability had become impossible to obtain-to-wit: Receiving
title from Pratt. This situation is usually referred to as a
destruction of means of performance contemplated but not
contracted for. The contract could not be performed because of the i~mpossibility of obtaining title from the source
contemplated. It ·cannot be said that the contract was intended to forever bar the defendant, Page, from forever
dealing with the property without becoming a trustee for
Johnson of such interest that he might obtain.
The only correct conclusion that the court could come
to was that the contract ceased upon Pratt's death because
of a supervening impossibility of performance.
The Restatement sets forth the rule as follows:
"Where the assumed possibility of a desired object
or effect to be attained by either party to a ·contract
forms the basis on which both parties enter into it, and
this object or effect is or surely will be frustrated, a
promisor who is without fault in causing the frustra-
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tion, and who is harmed thereby, is discharged from
the duty of performing his promise unless a eontrary
intention appears.''
Restatement Ru1e 288.
This is exactly the situation in the principal case. Both
Johnson and Page assumed that the land in question was
that to be obtained from Pratt. If the reverse were true
we would ·have in effect a contract to build levies, dikes and
canals to be used on certain lands, one-half of whi~ch lands
were to belong to each of the parties to the contract if and
-vvhen either of them acquired them. This is incongruous
and inconsistent with the facts.
Another analogy to the principal situation ·which is also
in point is Restatement Rule 281, which is as follows:
"In promises for an agreed exchange, a promisor

is discharged from the duty of performing his promise
if substantial performance of the return promise is impossible because of the non-existence, destruction or
in1.pairment of the requisite subject matter or means
of performance, provided that the promisor has not
·himself wrongfully caused the irnpossibility or has not
assumed the duty that the subject-matter or means of
performance shall exist unimpaired.''
Illustration 2 under the a'bove citation is a good ·analogy
to appellant's argument that because the first contract failed
because of the impossibility of obtaining the subject matter,
the fact that it later becomes possible does not renew or restore the contract.
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POINT 2
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION OR FIND
FOR THE DEFENDANT, PAGE, FOR REASON THAT
THE SAME WAS BARRED BY LACHES AND THE
STATUTE 0'F LIMITATIO'N.
The law in Utah in respect to the Statute of Limitations
upon an action based upon contract is as follows:
U. C. A. 78-12-23-Within six years:
p1~ofits

1.

An action for mesne

2.

An action upon any eontract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in writing,
except those mentioned in the preceding section.

of real estate.

In matters involving equitable p.voblems the question of
laches is usually resolved on the basis of the Statute of Limitations in respect to similar legal questions, and the defense
of the Statute of Lirnitations includes the defense of laches.
The court, in effect, found that in the summer of 1940
the defendant, Page, recalled his employees from the work
project of building the levies and canals and that thereafter
the work was never resumed. There can be no other conclusion from this finding of the court other than that the
court eoncluded that Page breached his contract during the
summer of 1940 by withdrawing his men. If so, there was
a breach of contract which the plaintiff could have sued
upon and recovered such damage as he, at that time, had
sustained. It is a primary principle of law that a party has
the duty to minimize his damages and cannot sit baek and
idly wait for his damages to magnify and then e~ect to.
recover the increased amount. This is such an elementary
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point of law, we do not believe it is necessary to give to the
Court citations; consequently, if the plaintiff has a cause
of action, it arose in the summer of 1940, and he should
have commenced his litigation at that time. Subsequently
to that, on the 7th day of May, 1943, the court found that
Page obtained title to the property, which, if he did so ·contrary to the purposes of the contract entered into between
he and the plaintiff, Jolmson, constituted an additional
breach, which at that time would have allowed Johnson to
have brought his suit for an accounting and for a division
of the property, if he claims such was the case and his damages then .would have been the same as they are now and,
in fact, there would not have been taxes that have accrued
of which one-half have been assessed against the plaintiff.
Johnson admits that shortly after Page received the
property from Mrs. Pratt thart he demanded a half interest,
but that Page refused him (Tr. P. 24, L. 10 to L. 26). That
is when he should have brought his suit, for it was then that
his cause of action, if ·any, accrued. In other words, as early
as May 7, 1943, and, in fact, during the summer of 1940, this
action could reasonably have been commenced and should
have been commenrced, and it is rather late and untimely
for the plaintiff to come to court at this time and ask for
relief and damages. There is no question that if the allegations of the plaintiff are true and if the Findings of the
court are true, that on October 4, 1944, there was an additional breach, in that Page conveyed all of the property acquired to one Lewis for a price of $3,750.00. At that time,
there would have been no question but what the plaintiff
had a cause of action, if the other allegations contained in
his complaint are true, which the appellant does not, by this
argument, admit. Nothing has accrued since October 4,
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1944, that has ·changed his situation any or that has given
the plaintiff any new cause of action, and, in fact, all the
rights that had accrued, had accrued at this time without
question. It is obvious from this, then, that he should have
commenced his suit, in any event, not later than six years
from the 4th day of October, 1944. The court doesn't even
contend anything different than this, for the court failed
to make a finding that the joint adventure, if that is what
it was, continued after October 4, 1944, and, in fact, the
court found by its Conclusion of Law No. 3 as follows:
"That by reason of Page's failure to furnish men
and equipment for completing the levee and canal as
agreed by him and his failure to pay necessary fees and
costs to complete ~the appropriation of water referred
to in said agreement and by reason of his failure to
make any offer or tender herein to complete such ·work
or to reinstate or recover such water filing he should
be considered to have abandoned his right to continue
as a joint adventurer in respect to the property and project herein involved."
You will note that by the above ·conclusion, the defendant, Page, is said to have abandoned his right to continue
the joint adventure by his failures, as stated therein. When
did those failures take place? In the summer of 1940. If
that were the situation, then that is when the breach took
place. How, then, can there be any defense under any circumstances to the statutes of limitations having barred the
plaintiffs' case? It was pleaded, it was proved, and the
court failed and neglected, and, in fact, refused to make
a finding upon it.
The Utah Supreme Court has considered this matter
on many occasions. Perhaps the most clear enunciation of
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was made in the case of State Tax Commission vs.·
Spanish Fork, found in 99 Utah 177, 100 Pacific Second 575,
for the court said:
"The general rule is that an action accrues at ·the
time it becomes remedial in the ·Courts, that is, when
recourse to. the courts will. render full r~medy.'.'
The question is then, when did the cause of action accrue? The rule is that it accrues at the time when it
beoomes remedial in the Courts, that. is when ·the claim
is in such condition ~hat the court can proceed and give
judgment if the claim is established. In Sweetser vs.
Fox, 43 Utah 40, 134 Pacific 599, we find: "It is a rule
of universal application that a cause or right. of action
arises at the moment an action ·may be maintained to
enforce it and that the Statute of Limitations is then
,set in motion. The test, therefore, is: Can an action
be maintained upon the particular cause of action in
question? If it can, the statutes begins to run."
~othing

can be said contrary to. these rules, and it is
obvious that these rules apply to this particular case. There
may be some question as to whether there was an accrual
of. a ~·eause of action.-·The ordinary inter.pretation of the accrual is as follows:
"A cause of aetion upon a covenant accrues as in
other cases at the moment of the default ·on the part
of the covenantor. That is·, upon its failure to do the
thing agreed to which constitutes the breach.· Not until then •can an action be brought for breach of covenant. The question of tb.~. accrual of the cause of action on a covenant is important. Not only in.determining the prematurity of the commencement of the action, but also the question whether it is brought with,in the time limited for bringing such action. ·Action
for breach of covenant are, of course, subject to the
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defense of the statutes of limitations, if not brought
within the time limited by the statutes for bringing such
.action. ,
14 Am. Jur. 513, Sec. 37.
In the case of Hunter v. H·unter, 361 Mo. 799, 237 SWnd
100, 24 ALR 2nd 611, the court said:
"Statutes of Limitations are favored in the law,
and cannot be avoided unless the party seeking to so
brings himself strictly within some exception." (Citations) ''Such exceptions are strictly construed and are
not enlarged upon by the Courts upon consideration
of apparent hardship."
POINT 3
THAT THIE COURT ERRED IN FINDIN·G THAT
THE. TITLE TO PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY PAGE WAS
HELD SUBJEC'lj TO THE RIGHTS OF JOHNSON AS
JOINT ADVENTURER UNDER AGREEMENT- AND
IN IMPOSING A TRUST UPON ALL THE PROPERTY
ACQUIRED BY PAGE FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE
PLAINTIFFS.
The court erred in finding that the title ·acquired by
Page was held subject to the rights of Johnson as joint adventurer under the said agreement. In imposing a trust
upon Page for all of the property acquired by him and making it for the benefit of Johnson, it is obvious that this finding is grossly unfair. Even assuming the worst, that Page's
acquisition of the propevty was a breach of a fiduciary relationship, and even assuming that it was done by fr-aud,
with an intent to appropriate something that belonged to
another, can it be said that Johnson can sit back for a pe~
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riod of fifteen years and do nothing about it and contribute
nothing to the acquisition of the property or the expenses
of maintaining the property, or to the taxes or to anything
else and yet, when he sees that there is something to be
gained by it, to come in and claim that he is a joint adventurer and that a trust is imposed? In other words, it gives
Johnson the opportunity of becoming a joint adventurer or
a title holder or the beneficiary of a trust, without risking
any of his own time or capital.
In the event that the acquisition by Page had been a
failure and an runpvofitable venture, and, in fact, a losing
proposition, it is quite obvious that Johnson would have
claimed that there was no joint venture·; that the same had
been aJbandoned in 1940, and that he had no interest whatever in the property. In other words, the contention of
Johnson in this case is obviously a one-way street. Of
course, it is rather universally held that the plaintiff in such
instances cannot recover for the reasons stated.
In the case of Shulkin vs. Shulkin, 16 NE 2d 634, quoted in 118 ALR 632, it is said:
"that the contention that the wrong doer should be excluded from participating in the profits was rejected
and a partner who wrongfully appropriated firm property and made secret profits for which he was required
to account to the partnership, was held entitled to a
share in such profits with his co-partner.''
The court took the view that the correct principle was
that the innocent partner should be put as nearly as possible
in the same position he would have occupied if there had
been no ·wrong doing, and that this result ·would be accomplished by giving him that portion of the misappropriated
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property and secret profits to Which he would have been entitled if the misappropriated property had been allowed to
remain with the partnership and the secret profits had been
earned by the partnership in the usual course of the business. In other words, by giving the innocent partner or
joint adventurer all of the profits gained or all of the property acquired is an undue penalty, :and is in a sense an unjust enrichment. No one would argue that the wrong doing
joint adventurer should not be responsible for any damages
he has caused the innocent party, but to take everything that
has been acquired. by him and gained by hun and give it to
the innocent party does not make a right, but just commits
another wrong, and, a:s the saying goes, "Two wrongs never
make a right."
In 80 ALR, Page 88, it is said:

"Where one who has abandoned a joint adventure
is permitted to share in the subsequently earned profits, damages for abandonment of the enterprise should
be deducted from his share."
The above rule applies even in cases where the abandoning partner or joint adventurer did nothing to acquire
subsequently earned profits, but there is no question that
he is entitled to join in them if he, through his efforts, earned
them. Can it be said that Page has in any way breached
the contract more than Johnson? Wherein has Johnson
come in and devoted any time or money or effort as required
in the contract for the construction and building of canals
and ditches? Wherein has Johnson done anything to successfully conclude the contract as required in its written
form? Nothing; he has done exactly as stated above. He
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has sat back and expected to reap the profits if there were
a profit, but to take no part if it were a loss.
The court, in the case of Kinlock vs. Hamlin, cited in
80 ALR, Page 51, says:
"He comes into equity with an ill grace, to claim
compensation on a contract which he utterly renounced
and repudiated, to claim an account of the profits o.f
the concern which he forthwith abandoned when he
supposed it would be a losing business."
The defendant respectfully suggests that this is the position the plaintiff is in, in this case. It is he who has abandoned and repudiated the -contract, if anyone has, for he
has done nothing that is required of him, but complains only of the defendant.
The court erred in failing to find that the contract had
been abandoned as early as the summer of 1940. All the
evidence (Transcript Page 32, 55), points out that the contl~act was abandoned at that time by ]:)oth parties. There
can be no question, however, that it was abandoned by October of 19'44, when Page conveyed the property to Lewi8.
Under the circumstances the court should have found that
the conduct of the parties constituted an abandonment termination of the original agreement (May 21, 1940, agreement)~

The plaintiff admits that he signed a deed, a quit claim
deed, to Lewis in October, 1944 (Tr. P. 25) and yet he says
that he didn't find out about the conveyance until 4 or 5
years after Page had acquired the property. Yet, on Page
24, Johnson says when he found Page owned the property
he made demand for his half interest (which couldn't, therefore, have been later than 1944) and that Page refused to
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give it to him (Tr. P. 24, L. 10 to 26), and yet he waits for
over 10 years before prosecuting this action. What better
evidence could there be of abandonment?
This case is almost identical in nature to the case of
Richards, et al.- vs. Plumbe, et a1, 253 P. 2nd 126. In that
case, the plaintiff and defendant had on March i7, 1947,
entered into a written agreement similar to the one in the
instant case, whereby the parties were to secure certain
land within the Rio Vista Gas Filed Area for the purpose
of oil e~ploration. Through the failure of the parties to get
a license from the state and for other reasons, all the licenses expired in the latter part of May, 1947. (In the instant
case, the parties abandoned the contract in the summer of
1940, and the source of the property, Pratt, died shortly
afterw-ard, which are analogous facts). The appellant, Richards, went about other business (as did Johnson in the instant case), and the appellant, Richards went to Wyoming.
Plumbe continued on and secured the property and commenced to drill a well upon it. Plaintiffs, .appellants herein,
brought suit to have their interest declared ·-arid for their
share of the rentals which they yield. The court said:
"Nowhere in the record does it appear that either
appellant made the slightest contribution toward securing either the first or second community lease. The
facts as disclosed by Smith's testimony show no relation whatever between the original undertaking of appellants and Plumbe, and the activities of Plumbe and
his associates in securing the exploiting the first and
second community leases. The conduct of appellants,
and of Plumbe, is wholly inconsistent with the existence
of either a partnership 0[' joint venture. As is said in
Beck v. Cagle, 46 Cal. App. 2nd 152, 162, 115 P.2d 613,
619 "The abandonment or dissolution of a partnership
'
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or joint adventure may take place by conduct inconsistent with its continuance." See also, Middleton v.
Newport, 6 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 56 P.2d 508; and Fooshe v.
Sunshine, 96 Ca. App. 2d 336, 343, 215 P.2d 66, 16 A.
L.R. 2d 1142. Such was the determination of the trial
court here, and this finding is, in our opinion abundantly supported by substantial evidence.''
It is respectfully submitted that the above case is in
point in all particulars.
In 80 A.L.R. 27 we find an annotation that is in point,

which is as follows:
"Where there has been a complete termination of
the deal for the consumation of which the partnership
or joint tenancy was formed, the joint interest of the
parties having been completely severed hy abandonment or otherwise, it has been held, contrary to the
general rule governing the rights of the parties after
dissolution, that thereafter each party may proceed for
his own individual benefit, without being accountable
to his former partner or co-adventurer for subsequently
earned profits.''
"This rule is more frequently applied in the case of
joint adventures, particularly joint advtentures for the
purchase and sale of real estate."
(Emphasis added)
"Thus, where a joint adventure for the purchase
and sale of land, whereby one was to supply the capital and purchase the land, and the other was to act as
agent in finding a purchaser, was never carried out, no
purchaser being found for the land, and the party supplying the capital took the land in his own name, and
the adventure was terminated, it was held that the selling agent could not come in, years after, when the
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value of the land had increased, and claim a share of
the profits arising out of the transactions at this time."
McCamey vs. Lighner (1920) 188 Iowa 1271,
175 N.W. 751, 80 A.L.R. 28.
This is the rule of the principal ease, and is universally
applied in eases of this kind where the actions of ·the parties
indicate termination and abandonment. The oourt in Bringgold vs. Sticky (1925) 167 Minn. 343, 202 N.W. 739, 80 A.
L.R. 28, held:
"And where the parties enter into a contract for
the purchase of land for the purpose of selling it at a
profit, which contract is abandoned because of inability

to pay

the land, and where one of such parties subsequently secures the land in an independent transaction and sells the same at a profit, it is held that the
other parties have no right to share in such profits."
~or

This ruling is to facts almost identical to those in the
principal case, except here the contract was mutually abandoned because neither party desired to go ahead with the
construction of the eanals and dikes, and also because the
land was unobtainable from the source (Pratt) originally
planned.
POINT 4
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN ASSESSING O·NEI-IALF OF THE TAXES AGAINST PAGE.
What explanation ean the court make for such a holding? There was no finding that a sum equivalent to onehalf the taxes eonstituted the plaintiffs' damages. If there
was no finding of damages in this amount there is no legal
principle upon which this assessment can stand.
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The law is clear that in a case where there is fraudulent or wrongful acquisition by one of the joint venturers
he is nevertheless entitled to share in the proceeds of that
acquisition to the extent he was to share in the joint adventure in the first place, less whatever damage he has
caused the other joint adventurer or adventurers.
In this case the defendant, Page, has acquired nothing,
but has been penalized for one-·half of the taxes paid during
the years 1944 through 1954, and the court has made no
finding oT explanation whatever as to wthy, how or on what
legal principle such finding was based upon. The inconsistent part about this finding is that the court held he was
entitled to the entire amount of his other e~nditures in
respect to the property returned. Why one-half in one instance and the full amount in the other?
CONCLUSION

There is no justification in law or in fact :for the finding and decree of the court, and the same should be reversed,
or remanded for a new trial.
.Respectfully submitted,

PAUL J. MERRILL
JACKSON B. HOWARD
Attorneys for Appellant
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